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Abstract—With recent advances in reverse engineering, attack-
ers can reconstruct a netlist to counterfeit chips by opening the
die and scanning all layers of authentic chips. This relatively easy
counterfeiting is made possible by the use of the standard simple
clocking scheme, where all combinational blocks function within
one clock period, so that a netlist of combinational logic gates
and flip-flops is sufficient to duplicate a design. In this paper,
we propose to invalidate the assumption that a netlist completely
represents the function of a circuit with unconventional timing.
With the introduced wave-pipelining paths, attackers have to
capture gate and interconnect delays during reverse engineering,
or to test a huge number of combinational paths to identify
the wave-pipelining paths. To hinder the test-based attack,
we construct false paths with wave-pipelining to increase the
counterfeiting challenge. Experimental results confirm that wave-
pipelining true paths and false paths can be constructed in
benchmark circuits successfully with only a negligible cost, thus
thwarting the potential attack techniques.
I. INTRODUCTION
A major IC (Integrated Circuit) counterfeiting threat is the
illegal production of chips by a third party with a netlist re-
verse engineered from authentic chips. In reverse engineering,
authentic chips are delayered and imaged to identify logic
gates, flip-flops, and their connections to reconstruct a netlist.
Because the recognized netlist carries all necessary design in-
formation, this reverse engineering flow allows counterfeiters
to reproduce authentic chips with much freedom.
Several techniques have been proposed to thwart reverse
engineering attacks on authentic chips. The first method is
IC camouflaging which tries to prevent the netlist from being
recognized easily [2]. In [3] transistors are manipulated with
a stealthy doping technique during manufacturing so that they
function differently than they appear. In [4], the layouts of
different cells are designed to be identical, leading to difficulty
in interpreting the functionality of a netlist. The work in [5]–
[7] mixes real and dummy contacts to camouflage standard
cells so that they cannot be recognized by reverse engineering.
The method in [8] explores netlist obfuscation by iterative
logic fanin cone analysis at circuit level. In addition, the
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method in [9] introduces a quantitative security criterion and
proposes camouflaging techniques with a low-overhead cell
library and an AND-tree structure to strengthen netlist security.
The functionality of a given design is perturbed in [10] by
applying a simple transformation and a separate camouflaged
block is used to recover the functionality. Moreover, the
method in [11] creates logic loops by adding dummy wires
and gates to obfuscate the circuit topology. However, nearly
all these camouflaging methods can be deobfuscated by attacks
based on Boolean Satisfiability (SAT) [12]–[14].
The second method to thwart reverse engineering is logic
locking, which inserts additional logic gates, e.g., XOR/XNOR
in [15], [16], AND/OR in [17], MUX in [18] and look-up
tables (LUTs) in [19], into the netlist. These components can
only activate the correct function of the circuit with a given
key. This method is expanded in [20] to incorporate delay
information into the locking mechanism. Furthermore, logic
locking can be performed at sequential level to prevent the
circuit from entering working states without a valid key [21].
Recently, logic locking has been applied to protect parametric
behavior of circuits, e.g., pipelined processors [22], GPUs [23]
and analog circuits [24]. The method in [22] adds meaningless
clock cycles to camouflage a design, where only correct keys
allow a high timing performance. However, various attack
methods, e.g., SAT attack [25], removal attack [26] and bypass
attack [27] can potentially recognize the correct keys.
Beyond the techniques described above, other methods,
e.g., watermarking [28], metering [29] and split manufacturing
[30], [31], can also be applied against counterfeiting. But the
purpose of these methods are primarily to prevent overproduc-
tion and they need to be adapted properly to counter reverse
engineering.
The existing methods of circuit protection either make the
netlist more difficult to be recognized, or make the correct be-
havior of the circuit dependent on additional input information
even after the netlist is recognized. In this paper, we propose
a new perspective to counter counterfeiting based on reverse
engineering. Our contributions are as follows.
• A new dimension of IC camouflage is proposed to secure
circuit netlists by integrating unconventional timing infor-
mation. A camouflaged netlist thus only works correctly
with a given set of timing information, which, however, is
difficult to be recognized exactly by reverse engineering.
• To integrate unconventional timing into a netlist, wave-
pipelining paths are constructed in some parts of a circuit.
To prevent the exposure of these paths resulting from
clustering, the retiming technique is deployed to spread
them across a circuit by blocking the paths not related to
wave-pipelining construction.
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Figure 1: Conventional timing (a) A part of a sequential circuit.
(b) Single-period clocking.
• With the retiming technique, the area overhead to construct
wave-pipelining paths can also be reduced, since paths not
related to wave-pipelining construction are maintained as
single-period to avoid unnecessary delay insertion.
• A camouflaged netlist with wave-pipelining only contains
normal logic gates, so that it is challenging for attackers to
isolate and then identify the locations of wave-pipelining.
An attack method based on path delay test to locate the
camouflaged wave-pipelining paths would require a large
number of test vectors.
• The introduced wave-pipelining false paths obstruct the
test-based counterfeiting methods further, because some
paths that are originally testable are camouflaged as false
paths in the netlist.
• The proposed method is fully compatible with other secu-
rity techniques introduced previously, so that they can be
combined together to strengthen netlist security at circuit
level.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we explain the motivation and the basic idea of the proposed
method. In Section III, we provide a detailed description of
the wave-pipelining technique. In Section IV, we analyze
potential attack techniques to identify or circumvent wave-
pipelining paths introduced into the circuit. We also discuss the
limitations of these techniques and propose countermeasures
to thwart the attack attempts. We describe the implementation
details to construct wave-pipelining paths in Section V. Ex-
perimental results are reported in Section VI. Conclusions are
drawn in Section VII.
II. MOTIVATION AND BASIC CONCEPT
Digital circuits rely on their structures to define their func-
tions. A netlist is usually sufficient to reproduce a correctly
working circuit. To prevent the netlist from being recognized
by reverse engineering, techniques from physical level to
netlist level can be applied to camouflage the logic. These
methods, however, are still confined within the conventional
single-period clocking timing model, so that attackers only
need to recognize the netlist correctly.
In the conventional clocking timing model, all the paths in
F1 F3
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A data a 1 data a 2
data b 1 data b 2B
C
D
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data b 3
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Figure 2: Wave-pipelining. (a) The sequential circuit after F2
is removed. (b) Pipelining with two data waves.
a combinational block operate within one clock period. We
call them single-period clocking paths. Figure 1(a) shows
an example of a conventional sequential circuit with three
flip-flops F1, F2 and F3. The data switching activities at
internal points A, B, C and D in this circuit are illustrated
in Figure 1(b). We assume that data are latched into flip-flops
at the rising clock edge. At time 0, the input data of F1 is
transferred to its output and becomes stable after tcq , the clock-
to-q delay of F1, shown as data a 1. It travels further through
the logic gates and reaches B, shown as data b 1 in Fig. 1(b).
Although the data at B is stable far before the next rising
clock at time T, it is still blocked at F2 until the arrival of the
next rising clock edge to be transferred to the output of F2.
At this clock edge, the second data wave is injected onto the
path from A to B by F1 and starts to propagate. In this way,
combinational logic blocks are isolated by flip-flops and data
waves are pipelined to propagate through the logic blocks in
the conventional digital design.
A side effect of the sequential isolation with flip-flops
above is that the netlist carries all logic information. This
simplification allows attackers to counterfeit chips relatively
easily, because they only need to recognize the logic types
of gates, flip-flops, and interconnect connections with reverse
engineering.
To thwart the potential netlist attack attempt described
above, we propose to invalidate the conventional timing model
in the circuit under protection. For example, we can remove
the flip-flop in the middle of Fig. 1(a) to construct the circuit
structure shown in Fig. 2(a). The switching activities of the
internal signals in Fig. 2(a) are illustrated in Fig. 2(b). At
two consecutive rising clock edges, F1 injects data a 1 and
data a 2 onto the combinational path, respectively. Therefore,
two data waves at A are always separated by one clock period.
Since no flip-flop blocks the propagation of data b 1, it passes
through C directly and reaches D after traveling through the
inverter and OR gate. Once the data at D becomes stable as
data d 1, it waits to be latched by F3 while the second data
wave is propagating. To avoid that data d 1 is flushed by
the following data waves, the delays of all the combinational
paths passing through B and C, including those between F1
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and F3, must be larger than one clock period. Otherwise, the
change of the data at D triggered by the second data wave
data d 2 happens before the next rising clock edge, so that the
previous data d 1 waiting at the input of F3 cannot be latched
correctly. The result of flip-flop removal is that two data
waves propagate along the path without a flip-flop separating
them. This technique is called wave-pipelining (WP) and has
previously been investigated for circuit optimization as in, e.g.,
[32]–[35].
With wave-pipelining paths, the function of the circuit
depends on both its structure and the timing information
of combinational paths. If attackers obtain a netlist as in
Fig. 2(a), they need to determine whether these paths are
single-period clocking paths or wave-pipelining paths. If at-
tackers assume the former and process the netlist using a
standard EDA flow, the circuit loses synchronization, because
the data at the input of F3 is latched one clock period earlier
than in the original design. If attackers want to determine
whether it is the latter case, additional effort is required to
extract the timing information for each combinational path in
the circuit.
Though attackers may have access to the standard cell
library, e.g., through a third-party IP vendor, it is still very hard
to obtain accurate interconnect/RC parasitics by delayering
authentic chips, due to unknown process parameters, chal-
lenges in 3D RC extraction, and switching-window-dependent
crosstalk-induced delay variations, etc. In any case, the more
accurate the original timing information should be recognized
from delayered chips, the harder and more expensive it be-
comes to reproduce a design. Therefore, this unconventional
timing concept has a potential to open up a new dimension of
netlist security and can be combined with the existing camou-
flaging techniques, e.g., through dopant-level camouflage [3],
or dummy contact insertion [5]–[7].
III. WAVE-PIPELINING CONSTRAINTS
A wave-pipelining path such as the one in Fig. 2(a) allows
two data waves to propagate on the path simultaneously. Since
the second data wave must not catch the first one, special
timing constraints should be imposed for this path.
When creating wave-pipelining paths, a flip-flop in Fig. 1(a)
is removed to construct the circuit in Fig. 2(a). In practice,
this operation may lead to many paths with wave pipelining,
because any combinational path through B and C becomes a
new wave-pipelining path. When the setup time tsu and the
hold time th of the flip-flop are considered, all these paths
P should meet two constraints. First, the delay dp of a path
should be th larger than the clock period T . Otherwise, the
second wave arrives at the flip-flop too early and thus disturbs
the latching process of the first wave. Second, the delay of the
path should be tsu smaller than 2T to guarantee that the data
is latched by F3 correctly. The timing constraints for all these
paths can be written as
dp ≥ T + th,∀p ∈ P ⇐⇒ min
p∈P
{dp − th} ≥ T (1)
dp ≤ 2T − tsu,∀p ∈ P ⇐⇒ max
p∈P
{dp + tsu} ≤ 2T. (2)
If all the wave-pipelining paths meet the two constraints (1)
and (2), the wave-pipelining version of the circuit after a
flip-flop is removed is functionally equivalent to the original
circuit.
IV. POTENTIAL ATTACKS AND COUNTERMEASURES
The proposed camouflage technique with wave-pipelining
secures netlists with timing information at sequential level.
This new technique may face potential attacks. We analyze
some of these attacks in this section, though their experimental
attempt is not covered in this manuscript. In the assumed
attack model, the available information includes a netlist rec-
ognized by reverse engineering and estimated delays of logic
gates as well as interconnects with an inaccuracy factor τ . The
objective of the attack is to identify on which combinational
paths in the netlist wave-pipelining is applied.
1) First Attack Technique – Delay Estimation
In this method, the delays of all the gates and interconnects
are measured while the netlist is reverse engineered. Using
the measured delays, path delays can be estimated from the
netlist. Since the delays of wave-pipelining paths are between
T and 2T as defined in (1) and (2), these paths can therefore
be identified. The challenge of this attack technique is that it
is difficult to extract accurate gate and interconnect delays just
from reverse engineering, due to the inaccuracy in delayering
authentic chips described in Section II. Assume that the real
delay of a path is d, including setup time of a flip-flop, and
the delay recognition technique suffers an inaccuracy factor
τ (0 < τ < 1). Consequently, this path delay can be any
value in the range [(1− τ)d, (1+ τ)d]. If the upper bound of
an estimated delay is smaller than T , this path is definitely a
single-period clocking path. If the lower bound of an estimated
delay is larger than T , the path is definitely a wave-pipelining
path. However, if no such clear decision can be made with the
estimated delay, namely,
(1− τ)d ≤ T ≤ (1 + τ)d (3)
this path can only be considered as suspicious of wave-
pipelining. In the following, we call the range [(1 − τ)d,
(1+ τ)d] the gray region for a path with delay d. In reality, a
well-optimized design contains a huge number of critical paths
with delays close to the clock period T , so that their gray
regions often surround T . When constructing wave-pipelining
paths in the proposed method, we also guarantee that their
delays are in the gray region to counter this attack technique.
2) Second Attack Technique – Testing Delays
With the estimated delays, attackers can actually narrow
down the number of potential wave-pipelining paths, because
paths with estimated delays definitely smaller or larger than T
can be screened out. The second attack technique is thus to test
the delays of the remaining suspicious paths using authentic
chips from the market. With the netlist recognized, it is not
difficult to determine test vectors to trigger the remaining
suspicious paths. Since the only information of interest is
whether a path delay is larger than T , only one delay test
for each path is required.
To prevent all suspicious paths from being tested as de-
scribed above, we introduce a countermeasure to create un-
sensitizable paths with wave-pipelining. When we construct
wave-pipelining paths by removing flip-flops, we prefer the
paths that, viewed directly with the conventional single-period
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clocking model, are false paths, which cannot be sensitized by
any test vector.
Definition 1. False Path: A combinational path which cannot
be activated in functional mode or tested due to controlling
signals from other paths [36], [37].
Definition 2. Wave-Pipelining False Path (WP False Path):
A combinational path with wave pipelining that is a false
path when viewed with the conventional single-period clocking
model.
Definition 3. Wave-Pipelining True Path (WP True Path):
A combinational path with wave pipelining that is a true
path when viewed with the conventional single-period clocking
model.
Wave-pipelining false paths have two data waves propa-
gating along them when the circuit is operating, but they
are false paths when the netlist is examined assuming the
conventional single-period clocking model. An example of
a wave-pipelining false path is shown in Fig. 3, which is
a snippet of the s298 circuit from the ISCAS89 benchmark
set. When the flip-flop in the middle is removed, the dashed
path becomes a wave-pipelining path. If attackers view it as a
single-period clocking path in the extracted netlist, this dashed
path is also a false path. In this case, a signal switching at
the beginning of the dashed path never reaches the final flip-
flop. If the signal v2 has a value ‘1’, which is the controlling
signal to an OR gate, it blocks the signal switching along
the dashed path at the last OR gate; If the signal v2 has
a value ‘0’, it blocks the signal switching along the dashed
path at the AND gate right away. Consequently, the dashed
path cannot be triggered for delay test and attackers have no
way to differentiate it from all the other false paths in the
original circuit, which may contribute up to 75% of all the
combinational paths in real circuits [38].
3) Third Attack Technique – Logic Simulation
Since the delays of false paths cannot be tested, brute-
force logic simulation could be applied to differentiate the
camouflaged false paths from real false paths. In this method,
each false path that cannot be excluded by delay screening in
the first step can be assumed to be a real false path or a wave-
pipelining false path, so that attackers have to verify which
assumption is correct for this false path with simulations.
Assuming the number of such paths is n. If each path in n
can be a real false path or a wave-pipelining false path, then
2n simulations of the complete circuit have to be performed
to check which combination is correct. In theory, this method
can eventually find the correct combination of real false paths
and wave-pipelining false paths. However, it is still impractical
because of the unaffordable simulation time due to the large
number of false paths in the original design [36], [38], e.g.,
728262 for s13207 in the ISCAS89 benchmark set, and the
long runtime for a full simulation of the complete circuit.
4) Fourth Attack Technique – Sizing False Paths
In this method, all false paths in the circuit are considered
as wave-pipelining paths and logic gates are sized so that
delays of all these paths meet the constraints (1) and (2).
false path after wave-pipelining
controlling signal
removed flip-flop
v1
v2
F1
F2
Figure 3: Two true paths form a wave-pipelining false path.
The concept behind this technique is that false paths are not
triggered anyway so that they do not affect the logic of the
circuit if their delays are larger than the clock period T . This
assumption, however, is incorrect because false paths sized to
have delays larger than T may still affect the normal circuit
operation. Another challenge of this attack technique is that
it is very difficult to find a solution to size a huge number
of false paths without affecting the normal true paths whose
delays should be smaller than T .
5) Fifth Attack Technique – Delay Calculation
In this method, all gate and interconnect delays in a circuit
are calculated from path delays measured by testing. Since
path delays are linear combinations of gate and interconnect
delays, the measured path delays can be used to calculate gate
and interconnect delays by linear algebra. This method needs
to deal with several new challenges. First, in a commercial
design, a large number of combinational paths will be tested.
Second, all logic gates and interconnect segments should
appear on testable paths in a way that the coefficient matrix of
the system of linear equations has a rank equal to the number
of gates and interconnect segments, even in view of a large
percentage of false paths. Third, inaccuracy in at-speed test of
path delays exists due to environmental factors such as noise
and temperature as well as the nature of binary-search of at-
speed delay test.
6) Sixth Attack Technique – Pattern Recognition
To construct wave-pipelining paths such as the dashed path
in Fig. 3, the flip-flop in the middle is removed, leading
to a relatively large number of logic gates along this path.
In addition, interconnects might be lengthened to enlarge
the path delay to satisfy the timing constraints (1) and (2).
The special patterns of long interconnects and gate chains
might expose the locations of wave-pipelining paths. The sixth
attack technique is to search such special patterns to identify
the wave-pipelining paths. However, this attack method faces
many challenges. First, the uncritical single-period paths have
smaller delays compared with the critical paths. To guarantee
the timing constraints of the critical paths, interconnects along
them are usually short. On the contrary, the length of inter-
connects along uncritical paths might be large. Consequently,
whether wave-pipelining exists cannot be determined simply
by the length of interconnects. Second, the delays of the
logic gates can be camouflaged with multi-threshold voltage
(MVT) technique [39]–[41], where high Vt gates have larger
delays than low Vt gates. From the view of layout, there is no
difference between both types of gates, because the modulation
of the threshold voltages is achieved by changing channel
doping concentration during manufacturing [42]. To reduce the
number of logic gates along wave-pipelining paths, the logic
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTER-AIDED DESIGN OF INTEGRATED CIRCUITS AND SYSTEMS 5
gates can be replaced with high Vt counterparts to enlarge their
delays. Consequently, attackers cannot determine the locations
of wave-pipelining paths according to the number of logic
gates.
7) Seventh Attack Technique – SAT-based Attack
In the SAT-based attack methods, e.g., [14], [43], it is
assumed that attackers have full access to the scan chain,
so that they can apply input test vectors and observe the
outputs with the authentic chips. With various sets of input
and output observations, the SAT-based attack can determine
the locations of wave-pipelining paths that match all input and
output observations. In fact, wave-pipelining true paths can
be screened out with this method, since these paths can be
triggered with the at-speed testing. However, the constructed
wave-pipelining false paths cannot be triggered for delay test
if they are considered to work within one clock period. If
attackers try to activate such paths with two consecutive data
waves, all the side-inputs of the wave-pipelining false paths
should be set to non-controlling values in two consecutive
clock cycles. For example, v2 in Fig. 3 is one of the side-
inputs of the dashed wave-pipelining false path. It should be
set to 1 in the first clock cycle to allow a signal switching
through the AND gate. In the second clock cycle, it should
be set to 0 so that the signal switching can pass through the
OR gate. These requirements might be met by tracing logic
blocks between two flip-flop stages before F1. The traced logic
blocks should be set to appropriate values so that all the side-
inputs ensure the activation of the wave-pipelining false paths.
However, this method requires drastic changes in the existing
testing platform. In addition, the delays of original false paths
in the circuits might be larger than the given clock period
since they are ignored during timing analysis. By triggering
the conflicting logic with two clock cycles, these paths can
also be activated with two consecutive data waves, so that
the constructed wave-pipelining false paths can be concealed.
Furthermore, TimingCamouflage+ can be combined with other
existing methods such as scan chain encryption [44], [45],
to further increase the difficulty of activating wave-pipelining
paths.
To differentiate wave-pipelining false paths from original
false paths with SAT-based attacks, the whole circuit can be
considered as a black box, where only the data at the primary
inputs and the primary outputs of the design can be observed.
Since identifying wave-pipelining false paths requires to de-
termine where the flip-flops are removed, attackers can first
collect connections between gates along all suspicious false
paths and then determine where to re-insert flip-flops to re-
cover the original circuit without wave-pipelining. To identify
the correct combinations of inserting flip-flops, SAT-based
attacks search iteratively for discriminating input sequences
at the primary inputs. Each discriminating input sequence
eliminates one or more combinations of inserting flip-flops.
The iteration continues until only the correct combination
of inserting flip-flops remains. In [46], [47], similar attacks
have been attempted onto sequential circuits, and it has been
demonstrated that it is not possible to decamouflage relatively
large sequential circuits even with smaller numbers of keys
compared with TimingCamouflage+. Furthermore, Timing-
Camouflage+ actually introduces a new dimension in netlist
camouflaging. Therefore, it can also be combined with other
security methods, e.g., Anti-SAT logic locking [48], [49], to
counter SAT-based attacks together.
Recently, a Satisfiability Modulo Theory (SMT)-based at-
tack method is proposed to enhance SAT-based attack with
theory and graph solvers [50]. However, it is assumed that
all combinational paths work within one clock period. This
assumption does not hold in TimingCamouflage+, where the
intentionally constructed wave-pipelining paths have delays
larger than one clock period. To extract correct timing con-
straints of such wave-pipelining paths, their locations have to
be identified, which requires much effort as discussed above.
V. WAVE-PIPELINING CONSTRUCTION
When constructing wave-pipelining paths in a circuit while
maintaining its original function, we need to guarantee that
the constructed paths meet the timing constraints (1) and (2).
To counter the attack techniques discussed in Section IV, the
constructed paths should meet the constraint (3), so that they
cannot be verified easily. Furthermore, the wave-pipelining
paths should contain false paths when viewed as single-period
clocking paths. The wave-pipelining construction problem can
thus be formulated as follows.
Inputs: Original optimized design; gate and interconnect
delays; the given clock period T ; the delay recognition in-
accuracy factor τ (0 < τ < 1); the required number of wave-
pipelining false and true paths nwpf , nwpt; distance threshold
dist.
Outputs: A revised design containing at least nwpf wave-
pipelining false paths and nwpt wave-pipelining true paths,
where nwpf and nwpt are user-defined parameters. These
wave-pipelining paths should meet the timing constraints (1)
and (2) as well as the gray region requirement (3).
Objectives: The original function of the circuit should be
maintained; the original design should be kept unchanged as
much as possible; the increased resource usage should be as lit-
tle as possible; the physical distances between the constructed
wave-pipelining paths should be as far as possible to prevent
the exposure of these paths resulting from clustering.
When constructing wave-pipelining paths, we incorporate
PVT (Process, Voltage and Temperature) variations by al-
lowing path delays to deviate from their original values.
Specifically, delays of longest paths are enlarged to (1+δ)
times of the original values. On the contrary, delays of shortest
paths are reduced to (1-δ) times of the original values. The
value of δ should be determined by designers according to the
corresponding manufacturing technology. With this setting, the
constructed wave-pipelining paths should still work correctly
under PVT variations.
A. Work flow of wave-pipelining construction
The major steps to construct wave-pipelining paths are
shown in Fig. 4. Wave-pipelining paths can potentially be
constructed at a flip-flop connected to paths with large delays,
so that timing constraints (1) and (2) of such paths can be
satisfied easily. Therefore, we sort all flip-flops in a circuit in a
decreasing order according to the sum of the maximum delays
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Input: netlist, delay information, T , τ , nwpf , nwpt, dist;
For i=1 to |Fn|do
nf=check WP false paths(ffi , T , τ );
If nf > 0 then
If construct WP paths(ffi , T , τ )=false, go to L5;
If nwpf ≤ 0 then
nwpf = nwpf − nf ;
break;
Fw = ∅;
If a flip-flop ffi /∈Fw then
Fw← ffi , fanin(ffi ) and fanout(ffi );
Construct wave-pipelining true paths similar to L5–L15
L1
L7
L14
L5
L15
L13
If(DIS(ffi ,ffj ) < dist)
Sort all flip-flops F in a decreasing order;
Filter F → Fn using the number of source/sink flip-flops;
L3
L4
L12Fw← ffj ;
L9
L10
// the flip-flops that cannot be used for construction
//ffj are other flip-flops
Figure 4: Major steps of wave-pipelining construction.
of their incoming and outgoing paths as described above. In
addition, wave-pipelining construction might be challenging
at those flip-flops with a large number of incoming and
outgoing paths, because a huge number of wave-pipelining
paths can appear when the flip-flop is removed. To guarantee
all these wave-pipelining paths to meet the timing constraints
(1) and (2) is difficult, because these constraints require that
all the path delays should be within the range of T and 2T
simultaneously. Therefore, such flip-flops with large numbers
of incoming and outgoing paths should be filtered out. Since
traversing all incoming and outgoing paths of a flip-flop to
acquire their numbers is time-consuming, we use the numbers
of source and sink flip-flops of a flip-flop to indicate the
difficulty in constructing wave-pipelining paths. Therefore,
flip-flops with the number of source or sink flip-flops larger
than a given a threshold are filtered out to accelerate the
construction.
After sorting and filtering flip-flops, for each remaining flip-
flop ffi , we check whether there are wave-pipelining false
paths that can be formed from single-period true paths on the
left and on the right of ffi (L7). The number of such paths
is stored in nf . If wave-pipelining false paths can be formed
at ffi , the function construct WP paths(ffi , T , τ ) is used to
construct such paths eventually with the combinational logic
leaving from and arriving at it. The identified logic gates are
also expanded to include all the gates reachable from them,
because sizing the logic gates on the wave-pipelining paths
also affects delays of paths through the expanded gates. All
these gates are denoted together as a set G. The details of this
construction will be explained later.
As shown in Fig. 2(a), for a wave-pipelining path, the flip-
flop at the beginning of the path and the flip-flop at the end
of the path should not be removed from the circuit during
constructing of further wave-pipelining paths. Otherwise, paths
with more than 2 waves may appear, requiring more com-
plex timing constraints. These fanin and fanout flip-flops are
inserted into the set Fw (L10) and all the flip-flops tracked
by Fw cannot be considered as candidates to construct wave-
pipelining paths. In addition, the physical distance between the
fanin fanout
500 path limit 500 path limit
F
T
F
T
F
T
T
ffi
Figure 5: The number of paths on each side of ffi is limited
to 500.
wave-pipelining paths should be large to prevent the exposure
resulting from the clustering of such paths. We use the
distances between flip-flops to represent the distances between
wave-pipelining paths. Therefore, a flip-flop ffj whose distance
to ffi that is currently used to construct wave-pipelining is
smaller than dist cannot be a candidate for wave-pipelining,
so that it is inserted into the set Fw.
In the last step of the proposed method, we construct wave-
pipelining paths that are still true viewed with the single-
period clocking model. These paths are used to guarantee
that attackers must test all single-period clocking and wave-
pipelining true paths whose delays meet the gray region
requirement. Without these paths, attackers can assume all
testable paths are single-period and avoid the expensive test
procedure. Different from the construction of wave-pipelining
false paths, the construction of these true paths only relies on
path delays. The path construction in this step is similar to
L5–L15 in Fig. 4. The only differences in this construction
are that at L7 we check wave-pipelining true paths and in
L13 and L14 we use nwpt as the number of such paths to be
constructed.
B. False path checking
In the work flow above, we need to check very often whether
a path is false or not. In the proposed method, we only consider
the statically unsensitizable paths as false paths [51], [52],
such as the false path shown in Fig. 3. In this example, the
path cannot be sensitized because the controlling signal v2
blocks either the AND gate or the last OR gate, no matter what
its value is. Besides statically unsensitizable paths, there are
also dynamically unsensitizable paths [36], which, however,
might still be sensitized by test vectors set through the scan
chain [53]. Therefore, statically unsensitizable paths are more
conservative in thwarting attacks and thus used in our method.
To verify whether a path is statically unsensitizable, we
assign Boolean variables to the inputs and output of each gate
and formulate false path checking as a SAT problem [52].
The logic relations between these variables are established
according to functions of the corresponding logic gates. If a
path can be sensitized, all the side inputs of the path must
be set to the non-controlling values. For example, the path in
Fig. 3 requires that the condition (v2 ∧¬v2) is true, which is,
however, always false.
In implementing the function check WP false paths(ffi , T ,
τ ) in Fig. 4, we randomly select 500 paths that drive the cur-
rent flip-flop ffi and exclude the false paths from them, because
the wave-pipelining paths to be constructed should be formed
by two single-period clocking true paths. Similarly, we select
500 paths that are driven by ffi and exclude the false paths.
By limiting the number of paths we avoid to enumerate all
paths while searching wave-pipelining false paths, which are in
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Figure 6: Removal and retiming of a flip-flop. (a) The genera-
tion of a wave-pipelining false path with the relevant paths and
unnecessary wave-pipelining paths with the irrelevant paths
after the flip-flop ffi is removed. (b) ffi is retimed to the left
of the OR gate to block irrelevant paths.
fact abundant in the circuits as demonstrated by experimental
results in Section VI. The concept of this path selection is
illustrated in Fig. 5.
C. Retiming to facilitate wave-pipelining construction
With the false path checking method described above, we
can check whether wave-pipelining false paths can be formed
from the selected single-period true paths on the left and right
of flip-flop ffi . If such wave-pipelining false paths can be
formed, we mark the original single-period clocking true paths
forming them as relevant paths. Other singe-period clocking
paths are called irrelevant paths. An example of the relevant
and irrelevant paths is shown in Fig. 6(a). To construct wave-
pipelining with relevant paths, the flip-flop ffi in the middle
can be removed. Unfortunately, the removal of ffi makes all
the paths connected with it wave-pipelining. Since many short
paths may exist on the left and on the right of ffi , connecting
them by removing ffi directly generates many paths whose
delays are too small to meet the lower bound of the wave-
pipelining constraint (1). In addition, the removal of the flip-
flop leads to a clustering of wave-pipelining paths, which are
vulnerable to be identified by attackers. Fig. 6(a) illustrates a
construction example, where a wave-pipelining false path is
formed from the relevant paths after ffi is removed. However,
the irrelevant paths on the left and the right of ffi lead
to unnecessary wave-pipelining generation. To deal with the
challenges, we try to maintain the irrelevant paths on the left
and right of ffi to be single-period as much as possible.
To maintain the irrelevant paths as single-period clocking
paths, we apply the retiming technique [54] to block these
paths with flip-flops. Retiming transforms the structure of a
circuit by moving the locations of flip-flops while preserving
the function of this circuit. This concept is illustrated in
Fig. 6(b), where the flip-flop ffi is moved to the left of the
OR gate. To maintain the original function of the circuit, a
flip-flop is inserted at each input of the OR gate.
The concept of retiming can be explained using Fig. 7. To
apply this technique, we use g ∈ G to represent a combina-
tional gate and a net e ∈ E to represent the net connecting
the output of a combinational gate and an input of another
combinational gate. The delays from the input pins of a gate
(b)
Retimed by -1
Retimed by 1
(a)
g g
1
w(egi,gj )=0
gi
gj
2
gi
gj
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wr(egi,gj )=1
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Figure 7: Operations of retiming. (a) Basic operations of
retiming. (b) Two retiming cases.
to its output pin are different, due to the internal structure of
the gate. Therefore, these delays should be set individually
according to the corresponding lookup table. Since the input
pins of a gate appear along different combinational paths, we
use dpg to represent the pin-to-pin delay for gate g along the
path p. Interconnect delays can be modeled as extra nodes
between nets, similar to combinational gates. Each net egi,gj
between gates gi and gj has a weight w(egi,gj ) to represent
the number of flip-flops along the connection. Assume that
between two gates gi and gj , there is a path p. The propagation
delay of this path is equal to the sum of the delays of the gates
on the path, expressed as follows
d(p) =
n∑
k=1
dpgk (4)
where n is the number of gates on the path. Furthermore, the
weight of a path p, representing the total number of flip-flops
on the path, is defined as the sum of the weights of the nets
along the path, expressed as
w(p) =
n−1∑
k=1
w(ek). (5)
The goal of retiming is to find an assignment of an integer
r(g) for each gate g to transform a circuit to another func-
tionally equivalent circuit. r(g) defines how many flip-flops
are moved from the output of a gate to its inputs. In Fig. 7(a),
the combinational gate is retimed by -1 if the flip-flops at its
inputs are moved to its output. In this case, the integer r(g)
of the gate is equal to -1 . On the contrary, the integer r(g)
of the gate is 1, if the flip-flop at its output is moved to its
inputs.
After retiming, the number of flip-flops on a net between
gates gi and gj is written as wr(egi,gj ) = w(egi,gj )+ r(gj)−
r(gi). Two retiming cases are shown in Fig. 7(b). In the first
case À, the flip-flop at the output of gj is moved to its inputs,
so that the number of flip-flops between gi and gj can be
derived as wr(egi,gj ) = w(egi,gj )+r(gj)−r(gi) = 0+1−0 =
1. In the second case Á, the flip-flops at the inputs of gi are
moved to its output further, so that the number of flip-flops
between gi and gj is increased to wr(egi,gj ) = w(egi,gj ) +
r(gj) − r(gi) = 0 + 1 − (−1) = 2. For a legal retiming, the
retimed weight wr(egi,gj ) must be non-negative. To meet a
given clock period T for a retimed circuit, any path p with
a delay larger than the given clock period T should have a
retimed weight wr(p) larger than 0 to guarantee there is a
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Figure 8: Removal of flip-flops together with retiming. (a)
ffj is removed for wave-pipelining construction. (b) Wave-
pipelining paths can be constructed from the relevant paths
and a small number of irrelevant paths after the retimed flip-
flop ffj is removed.
flip-flop on it, so that this path does not affect the clock period.
To construct wave-pipelining paths, retiming can be applied
to move the locations of flip-flops to block irrelevant paths,
so that these paths can still be maintained as single-period
to avoid unnecessary wave-pipelining generation. With the
retimed flip-flops, the irrelevant paths that do not contribute to
the construction of wave-pipelining paths still work within one
clock period. The relevant paths are used to construct wave-
pipelining paths by removing the retimed flip-flops. The details
of this construction are explained in the following sections.
D. Wave-pipelining construction with removal of flip-flops
combined with retiming
Retiming can facilitate the wave-pipelining construction
by maintaining irrelevant paths as single-period as described
above. We then construct wave-pipelining paths by removing
flip-flops combined with retiming. A simple construction ex-
ample is illustrated in Fig. 8(a), where the retimed flip-flop
ffj is removed for wave-pipelining and the retimed flip-flop
ffk is kept to block irrelevant paths. However, the removal
of the retimed flip-flop ffj generates many wave-pipelining
paths. To enlarge the delays of these paths to meet the lower
bound defined in (1), a large area overhead might be incurred.
Therefore, it is not straightforward to determine the optimal
location to apply retiming to construct wave-pipelining. To
deal with this challenge, we formulate the wave-pipelining
construction as an ILP problem. The goal of the formulation
is to achieve the construction of wave-pipelining paths whose
delays meet the timing constraints (1)–(2) as well as the gray
region requirement (3) with a minimum area overhead.
The removal of a retimed flip-flop leads to many wave-
pipelining paths from left and the right of the removal point,
as shown in Fig. 8(b). To guarantee the timing constraints
(1)–(3), all wave-pipelining paths may be traversed to check
their delays. However, this straightforward traversal might be
time-consuming due to the number of paths. To accelerate
this process, we assign two variables, sg and sg to represent
the latest and the earliest arrival times at the output of a
combinational gate g, as shown in Fig. 9. The latest arrival
time at gate gj is the maximum delay with which the data
from a flip-flop travels through the longest path and arrives at
the output of this gate, denoted as sgj = max{d1, d2, d3}. On
d1
d3
d2
sgj = max{d1, d2, d3}
sgj = min{d1, d2, d3}
gi gj
sgj
sgj
Figure 9: The latest and the earliest arrival times of gj .
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Figure 10: Removal of a retimed flip-flop.
the contrary, the earliest arrival time at gate gj is the minimum
delay with which the data from a flip-flop travels through the
shortest path and arrives at the output of this gate, denoted
as sgj = min{d1, d2, d3}. To tolerate PVT variations, For the
wave-pipelining paths after a flip-flop is removed, shown in
Fig. 8(b), if the latest and the earliest arrival times at points A,
B, C satisfy the timing constraints (1)–(2) and the gray region
requirement (3), all the other wave-pipelining paths resulting
from the removal of ffj are also guaranteed, because the arrival
times of other paths are bounded between them.
Since we do not know at which location the retiming should
be performed to construct wave-pipelining paths, a variable
yegi,gj is assigned for each net egi,gj to indicate whether the
retimed flip-flop on this net can be removed, with yegi,gj = 1
to indicate that the retimed flip-flop is removed and vice versa.
If there is no retimed flip-flop on egi,gj , yegi,gj should be set to
0. Consequently, the relation between yegi,gj and the number
of retimed flip-flops wr(egi,gj ) on this net can be established
as follows
yegi,gj ≤ wr(egi,gj ). (6)
With this setting, three representative cases for a net between
gates gi and gj should be examined, as shown in Fig. 10.
Detailed timing constraints of each case are explained in
Appendix.
Case 1: The net from gate gi to gate gj has the retimed
weight wr(egi,gj ) = w(egi,gj )+ r(gj)− r(gi) = 1, and thus a
retimed flip-flop ffk1 exists along this net. The retimed flip-flop
is not removed, denoted as yegi,gj = 0.
Case 2: The net from gate gi to gj has the retimed weight
wr(egi,gj ) = w(egi,gj ) + r(gj) − r(gi) = 1, but the flip-flop
is removed, denoted as yegi,gj = 1.
Case 3: The net from gate gi to gj does not have a retimed
flip-flop, wr(egi,gj ) = 0. In this case, the data at the output
of gi passes through gj directly.
When removing flip-flops combined with retiming, each of
the cases above can happen. We let the solver determine which
case actually happens during wave-pipelining construction.
After this construction, no flip-flop should appear on the
relevant paths. Consequently, if there is a retimed flip-flop on
a net along a relevant path wr(egi,gj ) = 1, this flip-flop should
be removed, so that yegi,gj = 1. Accordingly, the following
constraints should be met
wr(egi,gj ) = yegi,gj , ∀egi,gj ∈ E on relevant paths. (7)
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We thus formulate the wave-pipelining construction problem
as follows
Minimize α
∑
g∈G
ξg − β
∑
g∈G
ng∑
i=1
dig (8)
+ γ
∑
g∈G
r(g)(#input of g −#output of g)
Subject to
(6) and gray region constraints (9)
Case 1 constraints, if wr(egi,gj ) + yegi,gj = 1 (10)
Case 2 constraints, if wr(egi,gj ) + yegi,gj = 2 (11)
Case 3 constraints, if wr(egi,gj ) + yegi,gj = 0 (12)
where ξg is introduced to enlarge the delay of wave-pipelining
paths, which can be implemented by lengthening intercon-
nects. dig is the delay from the ith input pin to the output
pin of gate g. ng is the number of input pins for g.
r(g)(#input of g − #output of g) represents the increased
number of retimed flip-flops. α, β and γ are constants with
α ≥ γ ≥ β to prevent the exposure of wave-pipelining
resulting from lengthened interconnects and suppress area
overhead by more retimed flip-flops and gate sizing. The
conditional constraints (12)–(10) can be converted into linear
constraints as described in [55].
Since only one flip-flop is used to construct wave-pipelining
at a time and other flip-flops are kept in the circuit as shown
in Fig. 8(b), the part of a circuit around this flip-flop for wave-
pipelining construction is not large. Therefore, we solve (8)-
(10) directly with an ILP solver to construct wave-pipelining.
E. Wave-pipelining construction with duplication combined
with retiming
The wave-pipelining construction by applying the removal
of flip-flops combined with retiming described above might not
be achieved successfully for a flip-flop ffi , due to the circuit
structure and the restriction on the area overhead incurred by
lengthening interconnects, so that the ILP formulation (8)–(10)
may return no solution. To solve this problem, retiming is first
applied to block irrelevant paths as much as possible and the
circuit is duplicated in part to bypass such paths further to
facilitate wave-pipelining construction. To implement the first
step, the variable ye, which indicates whether the retimed flip-
flop on a net is removed, should be set to 0 for all nets in a
circuit to guarantee that all paths are still single-period. The
original flip-flop ffi should be moved to its left side to block
irrelevant paths as much as possible with the formulation (8)-
(10), as shown in Fig. 11(a). This leftward movement of flip-
flops leads to fewer logic gates to be duplicated, as shown in
Fig. 11(b).
In the second step, after retiming, we duplicate the logic in
the circuit and size the gates and lengthen interconnects so that
the delays of all wave-pipelining paths meet timing constraints
(1)–(3) as illustrated in Fig. 11(b). In the duplicated circuit on
the right of retimed flip-flops, we only keep the flip-flops at
which wave-pipelining paths terminate. The other flip-flops
stay in the original circuit. Afterwards, we delete the logic
gates backwards to remove those gates that do not drive any
flip-flop to reduce resource usage. When duplicating the logic
T WP
duplicated duplicated
sized
arrival times: scgi , s
c
gi
arrival times: sgi , sgi
maximum delay
of WP paths
ffj
ffk
F
T
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Figure 11: Wave-pipelining construction with logic duplication
and gate sizing combined with retiming. (a) ffi is moved to
the left of the OR gate after retiming. (b) Logic duplication
and gate sizing.
on the left of ffj , however, we need to keep all the logic gates
to maintain the correct function of the circuit.
In the duplicated logic in Fig. 11(b), we do not duplicate
flip-flops. Therefore, all combinational paths in the duplicated
logic are wave-pipelining paths and their delays should meet
the timing constraints (1)–(3). To meet these constraints, we
size the gates and lengthen interconnects in the duplicated
logic with an ILP formulation. For example, in Fig. 11(b), we
assume the latest and the earliest arrival times at the output of
the inverter in the duplicated circuit as sgi and sgi . Similarly,
we assume the latest and the earliest arrival times at the output
of the AND gate in the duplicated circuit as as sgj and sgj .
Furthermore, the delay from an input pin to the output pin of
the AND gate along the path p traveling through the inverter is
written as dpgj . With these definitions, the arrival times between
the inverter and the AND gate can be written as
sgj ≥ sgi + ξgj + dpgj (13)
sgj ≤ sgi + ξgj + dpgj . (14)
To reduce the number of duplicated gates, we try to connect
the output pins of logic gates in the duplicated logic to the
original gates as much as possible, as illustrated in Fig. 11(b).
In the original logic, the latest and the earliest arrival times
are constants. Assume that the arrival times at the output of
the inverter in the original circuit are scgi and s
c
gi
, and a 0-1
variable pi indicates whether the output pin in the duplicated
logic should be driven by the original logic. We can then
extend the constraints (13)–(14) as
sgj ≥ sgi + dpgj + ξgj − piM (15)
sgj ≥ scgi + dpgj + ξgj − (1− pi)M (16)
sgj ≤ sgi + dpgj + ξgj + piM (17)
sgj ≤ scgi + dpgj + ξgj + (1− pi)M (18)
where M is a very large positive constant used to transform
the conditional constraints to linear constraints [56]. In either
case when an output pin in the duplicated logic is connected
or disconnected with the original logic, only two constraints
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Table I: Results of Constructing Wave-pipelining Paths
Circuit WP True Construction WP False Construction Cost Runtime
ns ng nwpt nt n′t nwpf nf n′f np nd nr tr(s)
s35932 1728 16065 579 80213 80792 715 130087 130802 23.4 35 2 481.8
s38584 1452 19253 420 202647 203067 2486 722378 724864 9.7 63 4 736.2
s38417 1636 22179 8369 637091 645460 9837 594078 603915 18.9 105 0 643.8
s15850 534 9772 1932 1693510 1695442 606 20999926 21000532 98.6 0 4 699.0
s13207 669 7951 7830 294531 302361 13410 728262 741672 12.5 74 4 223.4
s9234 228 5597 282 5710 5992 1349 154825 156174 27.2 62 2 362.3
s5378 179 2779 844 8465 9309 706 467 1173 49.3 73 0 114.9
s4863 104 2342 300 359663 359963 0 70432413 70432413 38.9 26 5 3564.7
s1423 74 657 278 7997 8275 272 5698 5970 45.7 91 2 19.3
s1238 18 508 4 381 385 2 849 851 19.9 14 5 0.8
in (15)–(18) are valid.
In the description above, we allow a path delay to be
extended with lengthening interconnects. However, we try to
keep the delay incurred by interconnects as small as possible.
In addition, we try to reduce the overall area overhead when
implementing wave-pipelining. Therefore, we formulate the
construction problem as
minimize α
∑
g∈G
ξg − β
∑
g∈G
ng∑
i=1
dig − γ
∑
i∈I
pi (19)
subject to (37)–(38) , (40) and (15)–(18) (20)
where α ≥ γ ≥ β to prevent the exposure of wave-pipelining
resulting from lengthened interconnects and duplicated gates
and suppress area overhead by gate sizing. In this setting, the
effectiveness of camouflaging is more important than incurred
area overhead. I is the index set of all output pins. After
the ILP problem above is solved, the gates that do not drive
any other gates in the duplicated logic are removed to reduce
resource usage. With this extra step, wave-pipelining can also
be constructed even if the optimization problem in (8)-(10)
returns no solution.
In the ILP formulation (8)–(12) and (19)–(20), we assume
constant input slews and output loads for gate delays for
simplification. However, we do not know which combination
of input slews and output loads should be adopted for the delay
reference of a gate in the ILP formulation. For simplification,
the input slew and output load values in the middle of their
corresponding ranges in the lookup table are used as typical
values to select the delay for wave-pipelining construction.
After the wave-pipelining paths are determined, we verify the
timing constraints of these paths using real lookup tables in-
dexed by slew and load values. For each input pin to the output
pin of a gate, the delay and output slew are set according to
real input slew and output load using the corresponding lookup
tables. Due to the assumption of constant delays in the ILP
formulation, the real delays of wave-pipelining paths may not
meet the timing constraints. In case of timing violation, we first
size the logic gates iteratively to modify the path delay. If this
is still not sufficient to solve the timing violation, buffers are
then added or removed to meet wave-pipelining constraints.
If the timing constraints are still not met with gate sizing and
buffer insertion described above, we switch to another flip-flop
to construct wave-pipelining paths. However, the construction
process is not guaranteed to converge.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
TimingCamouflage+ was implemented in C++ and tested
using a 3.20 GHz CPU. We demonstrate the results using
circuits from the ISCAS89 benchmark set. The number of
flip-flops and the number of logic gates are shown in the
columns ns and ng in Table I, respectively. The benchmark
circuits were sized using a 45 nm library. We set the timing
margin δ to 0.15 to tolerate PVT variations and the inaccuracy
factor τ of delay estimation of attackers to 0.2. To simplify the
delay models, input slews and output loads are set to constant
values. However, TimingCamouflage+ is independent of delay
characterization and can work with any delay model. We used
Gurobi [55] to solve the optimization problems.
The results of wave-pipelining path construction are shown
in Table I. The column nwpt shows the numbers of wave-
pipelining true paths whose delays are in the gray region.
These paths are used to guarantee that attackers must perform
testing to distinguish wave-pipelining true paths from single-
period clocking true paths. Without these paths, attackers
can assume all testable paths are single-period and avoid the
expensive test procedure. The column nt shows the numbers
of single-period clocking true paths whose delays meet the
gray region requirement (3). When attackers try to detect the
locations of wave-pipelining paths, these true paths need to
be tested to determine whether their delays are actually larger
or smaller than T . The column n′t = nwpt + nt, is the total
number of suspicious true paths that are required to be tested.
The column nwpf shows the numbers of wave-pipelining
false paths whose delays are in the gray region. In the experi-
ments, we set the target numbers of wave-pipelining true and
false paths both to 100 and the threshold distance dist between
the flip-flops in the first line of Fig. 4 to construct wave-
pipelining true and false paths to 10 times of the minimum
distance between all pairs of flip-flops. We executed the
construction of wave-pipelining true and false paths shown in
Fig. 4 repeatedly using the method described in Section V-D
and Section V-E. When we constructed wave-pipelining false
paths, we also found wave-pipelining true paths in the circuit
and vice versa. Consequently, the numbers of these paths
shown in the columns nwpt and nwpf are larger than 100 for
many test cases except s4863 and s1238. In s4863 there is no
wave-pipelining false path and in s1238 the number of wave-
pipelining paths is very small due to the limited sizes of these
two circuits. In all large test cases, however, wave-pipelining
paths have been constructed successfully. In practice, as the
circuit size increases, more path candidates become available
for the wave-pipelining false path construction, so that wave-
pipelining false paths can always be constructed successfully.
The column nf shows the number of suspicious single-
period clocking false paths. Since their delays meet the gray
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Figure 12: The number of duplicated gates over the increase
of interconnect delays (in unit of buffer delays).
region requirement (3), these paths are suspicious wave-
pipelining false paths for attackers. The total suspicious wave-
pipelining false paths are shown in n′f = nwpf + nf . To
determine whether a false path is wave-pipelining or not from
a huge number of suspicious paths, much effort is required
as explained in Section IV, since these false paths cannot be
triggered for delay test.
The column np shows the equivalent number of inserted
delays in the unit of the delay of a buffer by lengthening
interconnects to enlarge wave-pipelining path delays. Since
the number of inserted delays does not increase with respect
to circuit size, the area cost for constructing wave-pipelining
paths is negligible in relatively large circuits.
In the experiments, we constrained the inserted delay ξg
incurred by lengthening interconnects to be no larger than the
delay of three buffers for each net. With this constraint, the
removal of flip-flops combined with retiming in Section V-D
can only be achieved in s15850 to construct wave-pipelining
paths. In the remaining circuits, this method cannot construct
wave-pipelining successfully, since a few short paths still
require much delay insertion to meet the timing constraint
of wave-pipelining. However, the number of such paths is
very small, confirmed by the total delays inserted as shown
in column np. In this case, circuit duplication combined with
retiming is applied as described in Section V-E. The column
nd in Table I shows the number of logic gates duplicated
to construct wave-pipelining. Since we only inserted wave-
pipelining paths at a limited number of locations, generally
the number of duplicated gates does not increase with respect
to circuit size.
To construct wave-pipelining paths, retiming might cause
an increase of the number of flip-flops, shown in column nr.
This increase and the corresponding area overhead are still
negligible. The last column tr in Table I shows the runtime
of TimingCamouflage+, which is acceptable because wave-
pipelining construction is a one-time effort.
We also applied TimingCamouflage+ in two practical cir-
cuits, vga lcd and pci bridge32, from TAU 2013 variation-
aware timing analysis contest. In both circuits, wave-pipelining
false and true paths can be constructed successfully. Specif-
ically, in vga lcd, 169 wave-pipelining true paths and 138
wave-pipelining false paths were constructed with 25 inserted
buffers, 60 duplicated gates and 5 more retimed flip-flops.
In pci bridge32, 206 wave-pipelining true paths and 1162
wave-pipelining false paths were constructed with 18 inserted
buffers, 43 duplicated gates and 2 more retimed flip-flops.
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Figure 13: Comparison of gate numbers before/after reduction.
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Figure 14: Results of false path sizing attack.
When constructing wave-pipelining paths by lengthening
interconnects, we constrained the interconnect delay ξg in-
serted before a gate g. Fig. 12 shows the changes of the
numbers of duplicated gates when the interconnect delays are
relaxed. It is clear that with the increase of delays inserted
before a gate g, the number of duplicated gates required to
construct wave-pipelining paths is decreased in three circuits.
When the allowable number of delay units reaches 9, no
circuit duplication is required for all these circuits. In s15850,
duplicated gates are not even required to construct the wave-
pipelining paths when the allowable number of delay units
is larger than or equal to 3, due to the efficiency of the
removal of flip-flops combined with retiming in Section V-D.
For s38584 and s35932, the removal of flip-flops combined
with retiming cannot be achieved successfully due to circuit
structures. Therefore, the numbers of duplicated gates are not
reduced.
In the wave-pipelining construction formulation (19)–(20),
we maximize the number of output pins that can be driven by
the original circuit as illustrated in Fig. 11(b). Consequently,
the number of logic gates in the duplicated circuit can be
reduced. Fig. 13 compares the numbers of gates in the origi-
nally duplicated circuit before the removed flip-flop in Fig. 11
and the number of gates after reduction by using the original
circuit. In all test cases, the numbers of duplicated gates were
reduced significantly.
In the experiments, we also simulated the gate sizing attack
on the netlist as discussed in Section IV. The basic idea was
that all false paths with delays falling in the gray region were
treated as wave-pipelining paths and their delays were sized to
meet (1)–(2). The results of this simulated attack are shown in
Fig. 14, where the first bar shows the number of false paths we
used to simulate the attack. The second bar shows the number
of false paths that were not sized successfully. Even with such
a small number of false paths from the huge set of false paths
in the original circuit, no sizing attack succeeded.
TimingCamouflage in [1] uses the same timing concept to
camouflage the netlists. However, it constructs wave-pipelining
paths with duplicated gates without applying the retiming
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Figure 15: Comparison of the number of duplicated gates with
TimingCamouflage in [1].
s1
23
8
s1
42
3
s4
86
3
s5
37
8
s9
23
4
s1
32
07
s1
58
50
s3
84
17
s3
85
84
s3
59
32
0
50
100
150
#i
ns
er
te
d
bu
ff
er
s TimingCamouflage TimingCamouflage+
Figure 16: Comparison of the number of inserted delay units
with TimingCamouflage in [1].
technique. Consequently, it requires many duplicated gates
and interconnect delays to construct the wave-pipelining paths.
To verify the improvement of incorporating retiming in Tim-
ingCamouflage+, TimingCamouflage in [1] was implemented
with the maximum allowable inserted delay units constrained
the same as in TimingCamouflage+. The results are shown
in Fig. 15 and Fig. 16. Since the maximum numbers of
inserted delay units were constrained to be no larger than three,
TimingCamouflage in [1] fails to construct the wave-pipelining
paths in s1238, s4863, s15850 and s35932, as shown in Fig. 15.
In the other cases, the numbers of duplicated gates with
TimingCamouflage+ are also smaller than those with Timing-
Camouflage in [1], except for s38417, in which the number of
duplicated gates is slightly larger in TimingCamouflage+. The
comparison of inserted delay units are shown in Fig. 16, where
the numbers with TimingCamouflage+ are consistently smaller
in all test cases than with [1]. The comparison of area overhead
to construct wave-pipelining paths are shown in Fig. 17, where
the area overhead with TimingCamouflage+ is smaller than
that with TimingCamouflage in [1], except for s38417. For
s1238, s4863, s15850 and s35932, wave-pipelining paths can-
not be constructed successfully with TimingCamouflage with
the maximum numbers of inserted delay units to be no larger
than three. The power consumption is roughly proportional to
the area overhead.
In TimingCamouflage+, the construction of wave-pipelining
paths is accelerated by sorting and filtering flip-flops described
in Section V-A. Consequently, the runtime is reduced signif-
icantly. The comparison of computation time with Timing-
Camouflage [1] is shown in Fig. 18. From this comparison, it
is clear that TimingCamouflage+ outperforms TimingCamou-
flage in [1] in efficiency.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed TimingCamouflage+ to
secure circuit netlists against counterfeiting. Since a netlist
itself does not carry all design information anymore, the
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Figure 17: Comparison of area overhead with TimingCamou-
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Figure 18: Comparison of runtime with TimingCamouflage in
[1].
difficulty of attack has increased significantly due to addi-
tional test cost and the introduced wave-pipelining false paths.
TimingCamouflage+ opens up a new dimension of netlist
camouflage at circuit level, and it is fully compatible with other
previous counterfeiting methods so that they can be combined
together to strengthen netlist security. Future work includes
experimental attempts of the attacks discussed in Section IV
and the combination of the proposed camouflage method with
other existing methods. Advanced timing concepts can be
embedded into the netlist to enhance circuit security [57]–[61].
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WAVE-PIPELINING CONSTRUCTION FOR TIMINGCAMOUFLAGE+
(APPENDIX TO [R1])
Case 1: The net from gate gi to gate gj has the retimed
weight wr(egi,gj ) = w(egi,gj )+ r(gj)− r(gi) = 1, and thus a
retimed flip-flop ffk1 exists along this net. The retimed flip-flop
is not removed, denoted as yegi,gj = 0.
In this case, the circuit can operate with a given clock period
T , if setup and hold time constraints can be satisfied, expressed
as follows
sgi + tsu ≤ T (21)
sgi ≥ th (22)
where (21) represents that the latest arrival time at gi should
be stable tsu before a rising clock edge. The earliest arrival
time sgi should be larger than th as shown in (22), so that the
data can be latched by the flip-flop ffk1 reliably.
The latest and the earliest arrival times at gate gj after the
retimed flip-flop is passed through are expressed as follows
sgj ≥ tcq + ξgj + dgj (23)
sgj ≤ tcq + ξgj + dgj (24)
where tcq is the clock-to-q delay of the flip-flop. ξgj is
introduced to enlarge the delay of wave-pipelining paths,
which can be implemented by lengthening interconnects. dgj
represents the delay from the input pin to the output pin of
gj , which is set individually for each input of gj .
To guarantee that data traveling from ffk1 and ffk2 are
latched by ffk3 correctly, the latest and the earliest arrival times
at gj should satisfy the following constraints
sgj + tsu ≤ T (25)
sgj ≥ th (26)
where sgj and sgj can be replaced by (23)–(24), so that (25)–
(26) can be converted as follows
tcq + ξgj + dgj + tsu ≤ T (27)
tcq + ξgj + dgj ≥ th. (28)
Case 2: The net from gate gi to gj has the retimed weight
wr(egi,gj ) = w(egi,gj ) + r(gj) − r(gi) = 1, but the flip-flop
is removed, denoted as yegi,gj = 1.
In this case, wave-pipelining paths can be constructed
between the fanin flip-flops and ffk3 , as in Fig. 10. After
ffk1 is removed, the data coming from the fanin flip-flops
pass the removal point directly and travel through the gate
gj afterwards. The data should arrive at ffk3 after the first
rising clock edge and before the second rising clock edge to
guarantee it is latched correctly [R2]. With respect to wave-
pipelining, the arrival times at gj should satisfy the following
constraints
sgj + tsu ≤ 2T (29)
sgj − th ≥ T. (30)
Since the retimed flip-flop on the net between gi and gj
is removed, the data at the output of gi travels through gj
directly. Therefore, the relations between their arrival times
are established as follows
sgj ≥ sgi + ξgj + dgj (31)
sgj ≤ sgi + ξgj + dgj . (32)
By replacing sgj and sgj by (31)–(32), (29)–(30) can be
converted as follows
sgi + ξgj + dgj + tsu ≤ 2T (33)
sgi + ξgj + dgj − th ≥ T (34)
and thus
sgi + ξgj + dgj − T + tsu ≤ T (35)
sgi + ξgj + dgj − T ≥ th (36)
where sgi + ξgj + dgj − T and sgi + ξgj + dgj − T indicate
that the removal of a flip-flop leads to the shift of the arrival
times by a clock period T after the removal point is passed
through.
Besides wave-pipelining paths arriving at ffk3 , single-period
paths exist between ffk2 and ffk3 . These paths require that the
latest and the earliest arrival times at gj satisfy the constraints
(25)–(26). To guarantee that the data from wave-pipelining
and single-period paths are latched correctly at ffk3 , the latest
arrival times at gj , max{sgi + ξgj + dgj −T, tcq + ξgj + dgj},
and the earliest arrival times at gj , min{sgi + ξgj + dgj −
T, tcq + ξgj + dgj}, should satisfy the following constraints
max{sgi + ξgj + dgj − T, tcq + ξgj + dgj}+ tsu ≤ T (37)
min{sgi + ξgj + dgj − T, tcq + ξgj + dgj} ≥ th. (38)
Case 3: The net from gate gi to gj does not have a retimed
flip-flop, wr(egi,gj ) = 0. In this case, the data at the output of
gi passes through gj directly. Therefore, the relation between
the arrival times of gate gi and gj can be established as (31)–
(32).
The wave-pipelining constraints in (1)–(2) for all con-
structed paths are met by guaranteeing the longest and the
shortest constructed paths as wave-pipelining with (37)–(38).
In addition, all constructed wave-pipelining paths should also
meet the gray region (3), so that attackers cannot determine
whether they are wave-pipelining or simple critical paths [R3].
For example, the wave-pipelining paths from fanin flip-flops
to ffk3 after ffk1 is removed in Fig. 10 should satisfy the gray
region constraint. To achieve this goal, with respect to wave-
pipelining, the arrival times at gj should meet the following
constraints
(1− τ)sgj ≤ T ≤ (1 + τ)sgj (39)
where the sgj and sgj can be replaced by those in (31)–(32),
to convert (39) as follows
(1−τ)(sgi+ξgj +dgj ) ≤ T ≤ (1+τ)(sgi+ξgj +dgj ). (40)
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